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plural order without the leadership of a single state, did it become apparent that he could no longer use the notion of sovereignty he had himself developed in Political Theology.
As Giorgio Agamben notes in relation to
The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt here 'makes no allusion to his own definition of sovereignty'. 5 The problem Schmitt encountered was that the European order had not only no single overarching sovereign who could decide when the order's normality had been breached, but also no enemy in the sense in which states had enemies: '[A]n enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity'. 6 While individual European states were going to war against other nations outside of Europe, Europe as a whole had neither such agency nor such opponents. Its 'outside' was (from the European point of view) not a defined entity, but simply undistinguished exteriority. 7 This meant that Schmitt could not refer to a constitutive outside for the foundation of international order in the same way in which he had done for state order. Nor did he think that the order of the jus publicum Europaeum was merely a loose arrangement based on the free agreement of the participating states. 8 Where, then, was the sovereign element of international order? 28. 7 If one is to rely on exteriority, this must be in the form of something. Schmitt thus writes that the enemy 'is our own question brought into shape'. C. Schmitt To solve this problem, Schmitt turned to nomos, or concrete spatial order. Already in 1934, Schmitt had contemplated the meaning of the phrase nomos basileus (nomos the king). 9 In The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt then considered at length the meaning of nomos as 'ruler'. 10 He appeared to think that there existed a spatially determined 'balance', 'tension', or 'equilibrium' between European states that would regulate European order. 11 However, the idea of nomos as sovereign leaves a number of questions unanswered. For example, how could concrete spatial order 'as a whole', as Schmitt claims, decide on its own normality, when he also maintains that there was no 'centralized location' from which such a decision might have issued? 12 Where was the point from which a situation could be assessed as having become exceptional, and to which order might have withdrawn to oppose the change it had itself produced? Where, in other words, was the point at which order became a self-reflexive 'we'?
This article reads Schmitt against his own expressed opinion, and against those of his commentators who also present nomos as the international equivalent to the national sovereign, 13 by questioning the ability of nomos to have constituted the sovereign 9 'One can speak of a true Nomos as true king only if Nomos means precisely the concept of Recht encompassing a concrete order and Gemeinschaft'. C. Schmitt, On the Three Types of Juristic Thought (Westport: Praeger, 2004), 50-51. 10 Schmitt, n 8 above, 72-76.
11 ibid, various.
12 ibid, 188. 13 Hooker, for example, writes that nomos is the '"solution" to the problem of pluralism' on the international level equivalent to national sovereignty, while Bosteels finds the need for an international
Page 5 of 36 element of international order. It suggests that the process of bracketing war that Schmitt calls Hegung took on this role in the order of the jus publicum Europaeum, setting out how the laws of war drew a boundary not just around conflict, but also around an order in which conflict assumed the ordering function of law.
NOMOS
Schmitt had turned to concrete order long before However, this did not mean that the decision had now become redundant for Schmitt. Rather than seeing the turn from the decision to concrete order as a turn away from the decision, one should see it as a shift in emphasis from the decision itself to its legitimacy, which Schmitt now located in concrete order. While this emphasis may have been new, the concern with legitimacy was not. As Zarmanian points out, even in his purely decisionistic days Schmitt had not been a formalist. Only if the decision correlated with the underlying order could it produce stability, and was thus legitimate: 'The ability of a decision to produce legal order does not depend on its content or form; rather, the rightness of the content and the form of the decision are deduced from their ability to produce a legal order'.
20
There is hence little evidence to suggest that Schmitt thought that an order could function without a decisional element merely because its nature was determined by concrete order. On the contrary, Schmitt warned that the pluralism associated with an order based on social institutions 21 needed to be tempered with the unifying actions of a 20 Zarmanian, n 2 above, 50. 28 Schmitt, n 4 above, 80, footnote omitted.
Page 10 of 36 space continued into Schmitt's work on nomos and beyond, 29 which means that any analysis of nomos must take into account the fact that for Schmitt, spatial order comes into being not after, but at the same time as the space it creates. Therefore, there was no 'filling in' to speak of.
The second problem relates to the difference between, on the one hand, structures that may be determined by certain processes, and on the other hand, an order that requires Rather than seeing nomos as historically preceding and eventually overcome by political formations and legal rules, and thus as distinct from law conceived as positive norm or agreement, Schmitt regards not only all law, but also political, religious and social order as reflecting the constitutive order of nomos: 'Nomos is the measure by which the land in a particular order is divided and situated; it is also the form of political, social, and religious order determined by this process. Here, measure, order, and form constitute a spatially concrete unity'. Schmitt, n 8 above, 70.
Page 11 of 36 becomes ordered, but there is no order as an entity unless the fence also unifies what it divides. This happens when a point is found from which the division can be recognised and regulated as such. For national order, this is the state. For an international order in which there is no arbitrator of conflicts, and in which each state preserves its sovereign right to go to war (and thus its right to reject precisely any possible consensus on the basis of which conflict could be settled), this unifying element is missing.
In This passage can be read in two ways. The first reading places nomos at the helm of international order, its bracketing function analogous to that of Hegung. If this reading were correct, then Schmitt would need to be regarded as glossing over the problematic he himself recognises in other contexts, namely that a structure that has arisen from the delimitation of elements, and that represents the tension between these elements, cannot 31 Schmitt, n 8 above, 75, translation amended. to be a continuous possibility if order were to exist. The sovereign element therefore needed to ensure that each war could be followed by peace and each peace could be followed by another war, keeping either one from engulfing the other. The gesture of sovereignty therefore was no longer one of expulsion, of pointing to the other or the outside, but of inclusion, of gathering two opposed states into a non-unified union. It was this inclusion that the process of bracketing war called Hegung managed to achieve.
MOIRA
According to the cosmology of Anaximander, formless, indefinite substance was separated into the elements (earth, water, air, fire) at the beginning of the world, when each acquired its own region:
The separation of the elements into their several regions was caused by the 'eternal motion' -which perhaps we should conceive as a 'whirling' motion (ί) of the whole universe, which sifts out the opposites from the primary, indiscriminate or 'limitless' mixture, in which they will again be all merged and confused when they perish into that from which they arose.
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This separation resulted in an order that was thought to be juridical in the sense that the disturbance of the 'equal balance' (δίκη or 'justice') between the opposing elements, the 'predominance of one element over another', 37 proper place. Derivatives of nomos thus denote the shepherd's allotted pasture, as well as 'dwelling place', 'quarters' and 'range'; the term 'law-abiding' 'has the older sense of "quartered" or "dwelling" in a country, which is, as it were, the legitimate range of its inhabitants'. 46 In this way nomos became associated with that which is proper to a certain place, with 'normal behaviour prescribed and enjoined within a given province, and so custom'. 47 While moira had been 'limiting and forbidding', 'always static, a system rather than a force, lean[ing] toward the negative', 48 nomos was 'dynamic and incline [d] to the positive'.
49
The question is what precise role moira assumed in this ordering process, and whether it should really be seen as merely the negative aspect of the normal, the limit that confined each part of normality to its proper place. Judging from the comments of those writing on the role of the state form in Schmitt's international order, the answer should be 'yes'. In this respect, it is commonly assumed that by limiting each state to a fixed territory (restricting its extension within the European order without thereby restricting its particular internal normality), the state form acted as the hinge by which normality (unity) was successfully combined with a plurality of elements (difference that cuts the knot of inter-dependence and brings into being self and other in one stroke. 61 However, it should be remembered that for Schmitt, the enemy (rather than the foe) is always already the recognised enemy, which locates the friend-enemy distinction within an established European order and thus after the successful conclusion of the process of recognition. The decision to lay down one's weapon when one has won, rather than to kill the opponent, is a general decision that precedes the designation of individual others as either friends or enemies. While recognition is concerned with an order's unity, the friend-enemy distinction is concerned with its plurality. here, peace and war are both internal characteristics of order. It is the laws of war, rather than the state form, which should thus be described as a hinge for plural order in which radical disagreements remain as much a possibility as peace. In Düttmann's terms, one might say that each time war breaks out in such an order and remains limited, the order is reconfirmed at the very same time as it is disturbed or 'interrupted' by war:
[O]rder 65 is not the solid ground of recognition, which gives the recognising and the recognised entities existence. It is a relation, a belonging together of the incompatible, which does not let itself be grasped together and which one therefore cannot grasp as unity; it is a relation of restraint, a separating, un-seemly belongingness, which interrupts its own unity.
66
To return to presocratic cosmology, if moira made an order possible in which a 'brotherhood' of elements continuously fought each other, it must have been concerned with the limitation of war rather than with the limitation of the elements. Such wars were represented by 'things', instances of war, which, according to Anaximander, came into being when elements overstepped their established boundaries, encroaching on another's territory. Things were made up of several elements, but they did not exist permanently, as eventually each part of a thing had to return to its element. 67 'Into that from which things take their rise they pass away once more, as is ordained, for they make reparation and satisfaction to one another for their injustice according to the ordering of time'. 68 It was moira that ensured this return -not by ordaining that the elements had to stay within their boundaries (if it had done so, wars would not have existed), but that if the elements did transgress their boundaries, they did so while leaving the overall order intact. As Russell writes: 'The thought which Anaximander is expressing seems to be this: there should be a certain proportion of fire, of earth, and of water in the world, but each element (perceived as a god) is perpetually attempting to enlarge its empire. But there is a kind of necessity or natural law which perpetually redresses that balance'. 69 As natural law, moira ordained the spatial delimitation of an area in which the dispute was to be heard by using branches or pegs around which rope was wound. For this, hazel branches were often used, as it was believed that they had magical powers that would protect from lightening and poisonous snakes, and grant fertility and virility. 85 The person presiding over the assembly then asked whether it were now Dingtime, Ding ('thing') being the case brought or the matter of concern. Like Hegung, the word Ding was originally a Hegewort, i.e., a word that brackets or encloses. It meant 'time' in its Indo-Germanic form of origin and only through an association with the time for assembly came to denote first the assembly and later the dispute itself, 86 its development thus describing a movement from the process of bracketing space to the bracketed space and finally its contents.
The procedure also entailed the president's demand for silence or peace. Such a demand is also associated with the concept of 'ban', the German word for which, another declaration, the threshold crossed once more. This time, peace lay on its other side. The threshold thus appeared to swap the descriptions of the two realms simply by being there; once the hostilities had been concluded, that which had originally been a realm of (unlimited) war, now became a realm of peace, while that which had been (relative) peace from the perspective of unlimited war, namely the limited war that took place within the threshold, appeared as an exception from peace in the first place. 93 Köbler, n 84 above, 36-37. 94 Rasch thus writes: 'During the hiatus or transition period from universal Catholicism to universal (secularized) Protestantism -and Schmitt dates this period precisely, from 1713 to 1914 -a legal and diplomatic system develops which normalizes war, thereby limiting it, and normalizes the friend/enemy distinction, calibrating clearly defined friends and clearly defined enemies with clearly defined states of war and peace'. Rasch, n 51 above, 37, emphasis added.
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In this way, peace began to appear as the more natural relation, to which war as a distinct dispute about certain matters of concern -the Ding or 'thing' -formed an exception. 95 Peace, which for Schmitt was only ever the fragile outcome of pervasive antagonistic relations, came to be taken for granted. Its dependence on the careful protection of war was forgotten despite the fact that the mere possibility of peace had only arisen at the point at which the parties entered into limited war. By agreeing to spare each other's existence despite their hostility, the parties acknowledged that it was possible, perhaps even necessary, to exist side by side in a plural order. Limited war thus had the effect of asserting society as an essentially peaceful plurality even when, or rather once again be remarked, had its origins in a religious-based philosophy which exalted peace as the highest and most "natural" condition of humankind and reluctantly accepted war as no more than an occasional, unwelcome and discreditable incident of mortal frailty and wickedness'. Best, n 81 above, 129. 96 Schmitt, n 8 above, 187, translation modified.
and militarily organized states could test their strength against one another under the watchful eyes of all European sovereigns'. 97 By bracketing war, the laws of war encircled a space set aside for war, which then exceeded itself to include, and found on the basis of its own foundations, a larger space engulfing its outside. As Prozorov writes in relation to the friend-enemy distinction, the bracketing circle can be seen as 'the founding event of a political community that subsequently recedes to its borderline as both exterior to its existence and indispensable for its formation'. 98 And this is perhaps the most surprising aspect of the process of Hegung: By protecting war from society in the state of nature,
Hegung reached back and behind this society to establish it as peaceful.
Europe thus came to be defined by Hegung. War no longer simply happened; it was staged 99 before a European audience, which it assembled as a collectivity of states, and which it ordered according to each state's involvement in the hostilities. It is thus unsurprising that Trier, on whom Schmitt relies for tracing the origins of the word in doing so, and in struggling to portray a measure of difference (i.e., nomos) as the unifying element of plural order, Schmitt actually described a third possible schema: An order in which law took the place of the sovereign, because law guaranteed this difference.
In this schema, law was concrete, yet no longer subordinated to a sovereign decision. Its scope could have been extended to include other states, but never universally, as it had no ground that would elevate it to a universal norm. The resulting order was inwards-oriented, self-reverential in the sense that its only unity, the limitation of warfare between its elements, was based on the need to protect its plurality, while this plurality itself served no higher cause than the existence of the separate elements. In drawing the line between war that effectively regulated the order's internal affairs (normality) and war that threatened that normality (exceptionality), law functioned as a boundary-drawing sovereign decision, while the sovereign decisions of states to go to war functioned as the ordering mechanism of law.
The effect of this reversal between law and decision was an emptying out, a postponement of sovereignty as meaning. The laws of war protected the continued possibility of war both from action that would reduce the number of elements within the order, and from a consensus that would reduce the potential for disagreement; from unlimited war, but also from a conception of justice. Schmitt called this order Hegung, an order in which war was protected and nourished as the best possible peace. The verb hegen or 'hedge' appropriately renders the sense of hedging that this 'sovereign decision' to protect war entailed: Rather than deciding now and hoping for the decision to prove itself right later, the laws of war postponed decisiveness as such -the decision to give 
